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AN APPRAISAL OF THE UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES'
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPI
CARL F. SALANS* and MURRAY J. BELMAN**
Since 1898, when the United States acquired possession of the Phil-
ippines from Spain, both sides have characterized relations with the
other as "special." As with other characterizations of this type, "special
relationship" has meant different things at different times. This article
will attempt to chip away some of the encrustation that has accumu-
lated upon this term over the years, at least in the economic sphere, and
to see what this special economic relationship should mean in the world
of the mid-1960's.
In the early period of United States administration of the Philip-
pines, the special relationship could perhaps be said to have been moti-
vated by a paternal instinct and an inarticulated but real sense of
national mission. While at the outset, the stated intention was to pre-
pare the country for independence, progress along this road was slow
in the early years. After World War I, empires began to go out of
style, and American attitudes began to be shaped by Wilsonian prin-
ciples of self-determination. This new philosophy prodded the national
conscience further into taking steps to make the Philippines independ-
ent. Japanese occupation of the islands during World War II and the
joint American-Filipino efforts to win them back added a new facet to
the special relationship-a spirit of allied partnership striving for a
common goal.
Upon independence, the Philippines, responding to assurances given
by the United States during the war, looked to Washington for assist-
ance in rebuilding its devastated economy. This search for help was
again to shape the relationship.
Today, the character of the special relationship, at least from the
United States' point of view, is probably a potpourri of all American
earlier attitudes towards the Philippines-paternal feelings, conscience,
gratitude and moral obligations.
However, the situation in the Philippines is not the same as it was
even five years ago. Whether desirable or not, American relations with
t The views expressed in this article are solely the authors' and should not be at-
tributed to the Department of State.
* Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
** Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State.
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the Philippines are entering a new phase shaped by what might be
called new Philippines nationalism.
On June 19, 1954, years of effort by nationalist elements in the Phil-
ippines came to fruition in the enactment of Philippine Republic Act
No. 1180, an Act to Regulate the Retail Business. The "Retail Trade"
Act prohibits aliens or corporations not wholly owned by Philippine
citizens from engaging in what is termed "retail trade" business, but
what is in fact a much broader area of business activity. To meet dis-
locations, the act provided that corporations already engaged in retail
trade at the time of enactment would be permitted a ten-year period of
grace during which they could continue and presumably phase out their
activities. The period of grace for individuals runs until their death or
voluntary retirement.
The forces that led to enactment of the retail trade law were so
long-standing and complex that they provide a classic case history to
students of Philippine political development.' Suffice it for our pur-
poses to say that the law was directed against the Chinese community
in the Philippines, a group whose long stay in the islands makes it
anomalous to call alien, but whose autonomy within the Filipino society
makes it just as anomalous to call native. For at least a hundred years
and perhaps for as long as four hundred, the Chinese community has
been viewed with suspicion and resentment by native Filipinos.2 When
the Philippines became independent in 1946, it became intolerable to
nationalist elements that this Chinese community could control, through
its ownership of retail trade operations, such a large segment of the
Philippine economy.
While ostensibly aimed at the Chinese, the Retail Trade Act has had
an impact on American business interests causing deep concern in the
United States. If the act as presently interpreted is enforced against
American retail trade establishments in the Philippines, it would re-
quire termination or major modification of operations which represent
some $250 million of American investments.
Despite the magnitude of this figure, it does not represent fully the
possible impact of the Retail Trade Act. Not only would American in-
vestments in these enterprises cease, but the entire climate for all for-
' For one account of the development of the Retail Trade Act, see AGPOLO, THE
POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE RETAIL TRADE IN THE PHIIIP-
PINES (1962).
2 For a detailed discussion of early treatment of the Chinese Community, see Miller,
The Part of the Philippines in the Opening of China to the West, 30 UNTrAs 130,
166-70 (1957).
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eign investment in the Philippines would be severely damaged. Perhaps
even more significantly, a cloud would be cast over the whole future of
commercial and trade relations between the United States and the
Philippines.
The retail trade problem is, at one and the same time, a reflection of
past U.S.-Philippine trade relations, a symptom of today's increasing
economic nationalism in the Philippines and a barometer pointing to
the future trade relationship between our two countries. We now
turn to an examination of these various aspects of American trade
relationship.
UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINE TRADE RELATIONS THROUGH 1946
The basis for a special trade relationship between the United States
and the Philippines was laid early in the American administration of the
islands. Reciprocal free trade, with certain limited exceptions, was in-
stituted in 1909' and strengthened in 1913" by the removal of some of
the restrictions contained in earlier acts. Until 1934, these trade rela-
tions continued on substantially the same reciprocal free trade basis.
The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, which established a broad pro-
gram for Philippine independence, provided for a gradual, partial
elimination of tariff preferences then enjoyed by Philippine products in
the United States. Tariff quotas were instituted that gave duty free
treatment to Philippine sugar, cordage and coconut oil, but imports in
excess of these quotas were subject to full duties. The act also pro-
vided for gradual imposition of export taxes (up to twenty-five per cent
of the United States duties) by the Philippines on exports to the United
States. Upon independence, all Philippine products would be subject
to most-favored-nation tariff treatment.
The preferential treatment accorded to Philippine products by this
early trade legislation nurtured almost complete reliance by Filipino
exporters on the United States market. During the period 1930-1940,
an average of over eighty per cent of the total annual exports of the
3 Tariff Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11 and Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 8,
36 Stat. 130. For earlier legislation pertaining to United States-Philippine trade rela-
tions, see Act of March 8, 1902, ch. 140, 32 Stat. 54.
4 Tariff Act, of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
5 See Tariff Acts of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858 and June 17, 1930, ch. 497,
46 Stat. 509.
0 Act of March 24, 1934, ch. 84, 48 Stat. 456. The Tydings-McDuffie Act was
amended by an Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 502, 53 Stat. 1226. For other legislation
affecting US-Philippine tariffs in this period, see the Jones-Costigan Act of May 9,
1934, ch. 263, 48 Stat. 670 and the Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680.
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Philippines was sold to Americans.' Practically all Philippine exports
of sugar products and coconut oil, and the major share of copra, abaca
and tobacco went to the United States.8
World War II brought cataclysmic destruction in the Philippines,
leaving the economy shattered. United States High Commissioner Paul
V. McNutt described the situation in April 1946:
Their economy is suspended, paralyzed. They have virtually no econ-
omy, no production of cash goods, no working at rehabilitation, no re-
pair, no making, no growing. Today, 10 months after liberation, their
production of export commodities is just a trickle. They are still living
on GI money, and that is rapidly, very rapidly disappearing.'
Despite these conditions, Filipinos still wanted independence and the
United States was determined to grant it."0 However, the Tydings-
McDuffie Act was shortly to require imposition of full U.S. tariffs on
Philippine products, and with an almost complete dependence on the
United States market, the Philippines would overnight be left to com-
pete with all other countries in that market. It was clear that if the
Philippines was to have a real chance for successful independence, the
special trade relationship with the United States would have to be con-
tinued.
PHILIPPINE TRADE ACT AND TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1946
The United States' response to this need was enactment by Congress
of the Philippine Trade Act" and the subsequent negotiation of a trade
agreement with the Philippines. 2 The act authorized the President to
conclude a Philippine trade agreement and establish exact provisions
to be incorporated in the agreement." The Trade Agreement, negoti-
ated shortly thereafter, was concluded on July 4, 1946.
7 H. R. REP. No. 1821, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1946).
8 Ibid.
9 Hearings on H. R. 5856 Before the Committee on Finance of the United States
Senate, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1946).
10 The Tydings-McDuffie Act provided for U. S. recognition of Philippine independ-
ence and withdrawal of American sovereignty on the 4th day of July immediately fol-
lowing expiration of a period of 10 years from the date of inauguration of a new
Philippine Government under the constitution provided for in the act. Ch. 84, § 10, 48
Stat. 456 (1934).
11 Act of April 30, 1946, ch. 244, 60 Stat. 141.
12 Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines on Trade and Related Matters,
July 4 and Oct. 22, 1946 [1947] 61 Stat. 2611, T.I.A.S. No. 1588.
is Congress could be optimistic that the Philippines would accept these provisions.
It was made clear that the United States' willingness to supply the bulk of war damage
payments would depend on Philippine acceptance. See Philippine Rehabilitation Act of
1946, ch. 243, 60 Stat. 128.
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The agreement provided for duty-free entry into the United States
of "Philippine articles"' 4 until July 3, 19541 Beginning July 4, 1954,
these articles would be subject to five per cent of the most-favored-
nation U.S. duty. The duties would increase annually by five per cent
until they reached 100 per cent of the most-favored-nation rate."
After July 4,1974, all Philippine imports would be treated the same for
tariff purposes as imports from any other country. For the duration of
the agreement, commodities which were not "Philippine articles," as
defined in the agreement, would be subject to the full most-favored-
nation rates17
The agreement also imposed absolute quotas on certain Philippine
commodities which made up the bulk of Philippine exports to the
United States, including sugar, coconut oil, cigars, tobacco, rice, and
cordage.1 These quotas were of two kinds: sugar, cordage, and rice
would be duty-free until July 4, 1954, and then be subject to the gradu-
ated duty treatment described above. The entire quotas for coconut
of and tobacco were treated on a duty-free basis until 1955, but there-
after the duty-free portion of the quotas would be reduced five per cent
annually. Other imports within the quotas would be subject to the full
United States most-favored-nation duty.
The agreement also provided for duty-free entry into the Philippines
of "United States articles" until July 4, 1954.2o Beginning July 4, 1954,
and ending July 3, 1974, United States articles would be subject to an
annually increasing percentage of the Philippine duty." Products of
the United States which did not fall within the definition of "United
14 As defined in the Protocol para. I(f), accompanying the Agreement with the
Republic of the Philippines on Trade and Related Matters, July 4 and Oct. 22, 1946
[1947] 61 Stat. 2611, T.I.A.S. No. 1588.
.. Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines on Trade and Related Matters,
July 4 and Oct. 22, 1946 [1947] Art. I, para. 1, 61 Stat. 2611, T.I.A.S. No. 1588.
" 'Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines on Trade and Related Matters,
July 4 and October 22, 1946 [1947] Art. I, para. 2, 61 Stat. 2611, T.I.A.S. No. 1588.
17 Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines on Trade and Related Matters,
July 4 and October 22, 1946 [1947] Art. 1, para. 6, 61 Stat. 2611, T.I.A.S. No. 1588.
1s Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines on Trade and Related Matters,
July 4 and October 22, 1946 [1947] Art. II, 61 Stat. 2611, TI.A.S. No. 1588. This
article also contained detailed provisions for the allocation of the quotas among pro-
ducers and manufacturers in the Philippines.
1) The Agreement also guaranteed an U.S. internal tax preference for Philippine
coconut oil. Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines on Trade and Related
Matters, July 4 and October 22, 1946 [1947] Art. IV, para. 6, 61 Stat. 2611, T.IA..S.
No. 1588.2 0 Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines on Trade and Related Matters,
July 4 and October 22, 1946 [1947] Art. I, para. 1, 61 Stat. 2611, T.I.A.S. No. 1588.
21 Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines on Trade and Related Matters,
July 4 and October 22, 1946 [1947] Art. I, para. 2, 61 Stat. 2611, T.LA.S. No. 1588.
1965]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
States products" established in the agreement were to receive most-
favored-nation tariff treatment by the Philippines.2
The agreement embodied assurances by the Philippines that Amer-
ican citizens or business enterprises owned or controlled by Americans
would be accorded the same rights as Filipinos to develop and utilize
natural resources and to operate public utilities.23 The Philippines was
required to amend its constitution in order to give effect to this so-
called right of "parity.
24
Article X, paragraph 4 of the agreement stated that if the President
of the United States determined and proclaimed, after consultation
with the President of the Philippines, that the Philippines was in any
manner discriminating against United States citizens or any form of
U.S. business enterprise, the United States would have the right to
suspend the effectiveness of all or any part of the agreement between
the two countries. If, after such consultation, the President found that
the discrimination had not ceased after a reasonable time, then the
United States would have the right to terminate the agreement after six
months' written notice.
The agreement contained a commitment not to change the par value
of the peso or suspend convertibility without the agreement of the
President of the United States.25 In addition, the Philippine Trade Act
prohibited negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement with the Philip-
pines during the life of the agreement authorized by the act.28
The Philippine Trade Act (and subsequent Trade Agreement) was
subjected to strong criticism in the United States. In a letter of April 2,
1946, to the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Acting Secre-
tary of State Dean Acheson expressed the views of the Department of
State on the then proposed bill.2 He argued that the provisions for
absolute quotas and the maintenance of an internal tax preference for
Philippine coconut oil were clearly inconsistent with basic United
States commercial policy. The United States at that time was engaged
in an effort to clear world trade channels of existing restrictions and
22 Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines on Trade and Related Matters,
July 4 and October 22, 1946 [1947] Art. I, para. 5, 61 Stat. 2611, T.I.A.S. No. 1588.
23 Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines on Trade and Related Matters,
July 4 and October 22, 1946 [1947] Art. VII, para. 1, 61 Stat. 2611, T.I.A.S. No. 1588.
24 Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines on Trade and Related Matters,
July 4 and October 22, 1946 [1947] Art. VII, para. 2, Stat. 2611, T.I.A.S. No. 1588.25 Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines on Trade and Related Matters,
July 4 and October 22, 1946 [1947] Art. V, 61 Stat. 2611, T.I.A.S. No. 1588.
26 Ch. 244, § 508, 60 Stat. 158 (1946).
2 7 Hearings on H. R. 5856, siupra note 9, at 75. A similar letter was written by the
Dep't of Commerce, Hearings on H. R. 5856, supra note 9, at 77.
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discriminatory trade practices. Secretary Acheson believed that the
restrictions and preferences contained in the bill would severely limit
the ability of the United States Government to obtain commitments
from other governments to eliminate similar practices. He also argued
that several provisions of the bill were clearly inconsistent with Philip-
pine independence. For example, he singled out the provision of sec-
tion 341 of the bill requiring the Philippines to grant Americans equal
rights in the exploitation of Philippine natural resources and to amend
its constitution accordingly. Acheson pointed out that these provisions
were not reciprocal, that the United States under its laws did not give
such existensive rights to Filipinos, and that we would not be required
to do so under the bill's provisions.
The Acheson letter also decried the provisions of the bill concerning
allocation of quotas as giving prewar producers a virtual monopoly of
the most important Philippine exports.2" New American enterprises, he
argued, would not be able to invest capital in these important export
industries, and new Philippine producers would not be allowed to com-
pete freely in their own country.
Finally, Acheson took issue with the prohibition contained in the
bill against negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement with the Philip-
pines for the life of the act. He stated, "I can see no valid reason why
the Philippines should be the only independent country which could not
enter into a trade agreement with this country."29
Despite these criticisms, the bill was enacted and the Trade Agree-
ment concluded, as described, under the time pressure of imminent
Philippine independence and the unchallenged necessity for special
measures to deal with the war-ravaged Philippine economy. President
Truman, when signing the bill into law, explained:
[W] e are providing for the establishment, through an executive agree-
ment, of an unprecedented plan of preferential trade relations with the
Philippines to last for twenty-eight years. We have never entered into a
similar agreement with any foreign government. Preferential trade rela-
tions are alien to the policy of this administration. In substance, how-
ever, H.R. 5856 is a rehabilitation act. Its sole purpose and guiding
philosophy is to furnish a formula for the rehabilitation of the Philippine
national economy through the encouragement of private enterprise and
private initiative .... 1o
21 See note 18 supra.29 Hearings on H. R. 5856, supra note 9, at 77.
30 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1946, 217
C1962).
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Thus, the special trade relationship between the United States and
the Philippines continued. However, instead of a preparation for inde-
pendence, the relationship was aimed at rehabilitation of an ally
devastated by war.
EXPERIENCE UNDER THE 1946 AGREEMENT
Soon after the negotiation of the 1946 agreement, Filipinos ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with its provisions. Economic development did
not progress as rapidly as anticipated. Some believed that the agree-
ment was not advantageous to the Philippines in that it tended to
perpetuate the dominant position of Philippine export industries
dependent upon the United States market, and it discouraged Filipinos
from establishing local industries to produce consumer goods imported
duty-free from the United States.
In 1950, an economic mission sent by President Truman to the
Philippines headed by Daniel W. Bell, made a report including the
following recommendation:
The present Trade Agreement sets the terms that will govern the trade
relations between the United States and the Philippine Republic for the
next twenty-four years. The Act under which the Agreement was made
was passed more than four years ago. Conditions have changed very
radically since then, new problems have emerged and new policies have
become necessary to deal with them. It would be desirable to have a joint
United States-Philippine Commission study the need for modification of
the trade agreement .... 31
THE LAUREL-LANGLEY AGREEMENT
On March 7, 1953, President Magsaysay of the Philippines in a
letter to President Eisenhower requested revision of the 1946 Trade
Agreement." Magsaysay stated that revision was vital to economic
stability in the Philippines and to permanent trade relations between
the United States and the Philippines. On March 16, 1953, President
Eisenhower replied expressing the willingness of the United States
Government to give prompt and sympathetic consideration to any
specific proposal for revision of the agreement that the Philippines
might offer."
31 Report to the President of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission to
the Philippines, Dep't of State pub. 4010, Washington, D. C. at 87 (Oct. 9, 1950) ; see
also Report and Recommendations of the Joint Philippine-American Finance Comnins-
sion, H. Doc. No. 390, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
3? See Dep't of State memorandum for the President reprinted in Hearing before the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives on H. R. 6059, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 13 (1955).
83 Ibid.
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Eisenhower's response paved the way, and negotiations to revise
the 1946 agreement began in Washington on September 20, 1954.
To prevent imposition of the duties scheduled under the terms of the
1946 agreement, the two governments hastily extended the period
of reciprocal free trade from July 3, 1954, to December 31, 1955.",
As suggested above, one of the principal objectives of the Philippine
request for revision of the 1946 agreement was modification of the
tariff relationships of the two countries to give the greatest possible
impetus to the lagging Philippine economy. The Philippine negotiating
mission, headed by Senator Jose P. Laurel, argued that, although
reciprocal free trade and preferences were intended to be mutually
advantageous, the Philippines during the years immediately following
the war had been unable to make any significant use of its privilege
in the United States due to the devastated condition of its productive
facilities. The United States, on the other hand, was able to take full
advantage of its privilege, deluging the Philippines with American
products, particularly luxury items. To remedy this situation, the
Filipinos proposed a "selective free trade" arrangement under which
Philippine products would continue to enjoy duty-free entry into the
United States until 1970, following which there would be a rapid
imposition of tariffs so that by 1974 Philippine products would be
paying full United States duties. The bulk of American products, on
the other hand, would immediately become subject to Philippine tariffs,
exceptions being made for those United States products essential to
Philippine needs. These would receive duty-free entry until 1970.11
This proposal was rejected by the chief United States negotiator,
James Langley, but the tariff question was resolved by acceptance in
article I of the revised agreement of a formula accelerating the rate
at which Philippine duties would be levied on United States imports
and decelerating the rate at which United States duties would be
collected on Philippine products."
34 In the United States, Act of July 5, 1954, ch. 459, 68 Stat. 448; Proclamation of the
President No. 3060, July 10, 1954, 68 Stat. c46. In the Philippines, R. A. No. 1137
(1954), 50 Off. Gaz. 3484 (1954) ; Proclamation of the President No. 49, July 12, 1954,
50 Off. Gaz. 2921 (1954).
sr Hearing on H. R. 6059, mepra note 32, at 142. For a Philippine account of the
Laurel-Langley negotiations, see PUTAT, REPORT ox THE NEGOTIATIONS TO AMEND THE
TRADE AGREEMENT oF 1946 BurwnN THE PHmippnEs AND THE UNuE STATES
(University of the East, Manila, 1955).8
-Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Trade and Related
Matters July 4, 1946, as Revised, Sept. 6, 1955 [1955] 6 U.S.T. 2981, T.I.A.S. No. 3348.
(effective Jan. 1, 1956) [hereinafter referred to as the 1955 Revised Trade Agreement
or the Laurel-Langley Agreement].
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Article II of the "Laurel-Langley" Agreement established various
quotas on Philippine products. Tobacco products and coconut oil,
subject to absolute quotas under the 1946 agreement, were placed
under tariff quotas only." Absolute quotas on Philippine sugar were
imposed without prejudice to any increases which the United States
Congress might allocate to the Philippines in the future (in fact, the
Philippines have enjoyed such additional allocations).8 Progressive
reductions of duty-free tariff quotas on such items as cigars, scrap
tobacco, coconut oil and pearl buttons were decelerated by the revised
agreement. Finally, the provisions dealing with allocation of quotas
among Philippine producers were deleted, because Filipinos partic-
ularly objected to these as an infringement on Philippine sovereignty
and as a discrimination against new producers.
The Filipinos also insisted upon deletion of article V of the 1946
Agreement which prevented the Philippines from changing the value
of the peso or imposing controls on the transfer of funds to the United
States. This too was felt to be incompatible with full Philippine
sovereignty. 9
The provision of the 1946 agreement perhaps most strongly resented
by Filipinos as an infringement of sovereignty was the so-called
"parity" provision.4" The Philippine negotiating mission requested
either complete termination of this provision or, alternatively, a satis-
factory reciprocal formula. The latter approach was adopted and a
provision was embodied in article VI of the revised agreement
making fully reciprocal the enjoyment by citizens of either country
of the right to exploit natural resources and to operate public utilities
in the territory of the other.
It will be recalled that article X of the 1946 agreement provided
that the President of the United States could suspend all or part of
the agreement if he determined that the Philippines was discrim-
inating against American citizens or business enterprises.4 ' This was
37 Each party retains the right under article III of the agreement to impose quotas
on a most-favored-nation basis or where there is serious injury to a domestic industry
or imminent threat to a party's monetary reserves. Ibid.
88 See Sugar Act Amendments of 1962, § 3, 76 Stat. 156, 7 U.S.C. 1112(b) (Supp.
V, 1958).
89 PUYAT, op. cit. supra note 35, at 11. A new article V was inserted in the agree-
ment obligating the Philippines to take the necessary legislative and executive actions
to enact and implement legislation complementing U. S. legislation (68 Stat 264 (1954))
to facilitate the entry of nationals of each country into the other for purposes of trade,
investment and related activities. A "treaty trader" agreement was concluded between
the United States and the Philippines on the same date, Sept. 6, 1955, as the Revised
Trade Agreement (6 U.S.T. 3030, T.I.A.S. 3349 (1955)).
40 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
41 See text folowing note 24 supra.
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another unilateral provision which Filipinos found repugnant. To
meet this objection, article VII of the Revised Trade Agreement pro-
hibited discrimination by either party against citizens or corporations
owned or controlled by citizens of the other party with respect to
engaging in business activities.4 2
These and other important revisions of the 1946 agreement, for
example, imposition of export 3 and exchange taxes," were agreed to
on December 15, 1954, three months after negotiations had begun.
The agreement as revised was subsequently approved by the Con-
gresses of the respective countries,45 signed on September 6, 1955 and
became effective on January 1, 1956.
The Laurel-Langley Agreement continued and even extended the
special trade relationship embodied in the 1946 agreement. At the
same time, the revision reflected the increasing sense of Philippine
independence, nationalism and pride. It represented an effort to
remove from our economic relations a number of irritants, and by
adding reciprocity, to recast the "special relationship" as a partner-
ship of equals.
42 Article VII provides as follows:
1. The United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines each agrees
not to discriminate in any manner, with respect to their engaging in business
activities, against the citizens or any form of business enterprise owned or con-
trolled by citizens of the other and that new limitations imposed by either Party
upon the extent to which aliens are accorded national treatment with respect to
carrying on business activities within its territories, shall not be applied as against
enterprises owned or controlled by citizens of the other Party which are engaged
in such activities therein at the time such new limitations are adopted, nor shall
such new limitations be applied to American citizens or corporations or associations
owned or controlled by American citizens whose States do not impose like limita-
tions on citizens or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of
the Republic of the Philippines.
2. The United States of America reserves the rights of the several States of the
United States to limit the extent to which citizens or corporations or associations
owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines may engage in any business
activities. The Republic of the Philippines reserves the power to deny any rights
to engage in business activities to citizens of the United States who are citizens of
States, or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital stock or
capital of which is owned or controlled by citizens of States, which deny like rights
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations owned or controlled
by citizens of the Philippines. The exercise of this reservation on the part of the
Philippines shall not affect previously acquired rights, provided that in the event
that any State of the United States of America should in the future impose
restrictions which would deny to citizens or corporations or associations owned
or controlled by citizens of the Philippines the right to continue to engage in
business activities in which they were engaged therein at the time of the imposition
of such restrictions, the Republic of the Philippines shall be free to apply like
limitations to the citizens or corporations or associations owned or controlled by
citizens of such States.
43 Art. IV [1955] 6 U.S.T. 2981, T.I.A.S. No. 3348.44 Art. I [1955] 6 U.S.T. 2981, T.I.A.S. No. 3348.
45For the Philippines, R.A. No. 1355 (June 18, 1955), 51 Off. Gaz. 3919 (1955);
for the United States, Act of Aug. 1, 1955, ch. 438, 69 Stat. 413.
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DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1954
Since the signing of the Laurel-Langley Agreement, new problems
have developed in Philippine-United States economic relations.
In the trade field, two major products, which have been the subject
of concern, are illustrative of these problems. The first, coconut oil,
was given a declining duty-free tariff quota in the Laurel-Langley
Agreement. 6 Since 1954, Philippine productive capacity has expanded
rapidly, so that now it far exceeds the tariff quota of 120,000 long
tons presently applicable. To sell this increased capacity Filipino
producers have not sought a revision of the tariff quota; rather, they
have informally urged the U.S. to adopt free trade. They have said
they are willing to eliminate altogether the tariff preference given to
Philippine coconut oil in return for a zero duty to be applied by the
United States on a most-favored-nation basis to all countries. While
their point of view on this issue is not altogether altruistic (their major
competitors are United States oil producers who are completely pro-
tected by our present most-favored-nation rate on coconut oil) it
does represent a modification of the Laurel-Langley preference concept
and a willingness to compete in the world market. This problem is
currently being considered by both governments.
Perhaps the greatest strain on United States-Philippine trade rela-
tions over the last few years was caused by United States' efforts to
secure Philippine cooperation in limiting its exports of cotton textiles
to the United States. In October 1962, as part of its implementation
of the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in
Cotton Textiles, 7 the United States government requested the Philip-
pine Government to limit exports of two apparel categories of cotton
textiles to the United States. These requests were later expanded to
include other categories of apparel, and, when no action was taken by
the Filipinos, import controls were instituted in accordance with the
Long-Term Arrangement.48
The first reaction of the Philippine Government was that the import
controls violated both the spirit and letter of the Laurel-Langley
Agreement. It contended that article 111(2) (a)," of the Laurel-
46 Art. H (2) [1955] 6 U.S.T. 2981, T.I.A.S. No. 3348.
47 [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2672, T.I.A.S. No. 5240.
48 Art. 3(3) [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2672, T.I.A.S. No. 5240.
49 Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article,... with respect to
quotas on Philippine articles ... a quota may be established only if-
(1) The President of the country desiring to impose the quota, after investigation,
finds and proclaims that, as the result of preferential treatment accorded pursuant
to this Agreement, any article of the other country is being imported in such in-
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Langley Agreement permitted the United States to impose quotas on
Philippine articles only if the President of the United States should
find and proclaim that these articles were being imported in such
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten
serious injury to United States producers of like or competitive
products. The United States responded that such a proclamation
(which had not been issued) was required only where a discriminatory
quota was being imposed. If the quota was nondiscriminatory, article
III(1)0 required only that importation of like articles from all third
countries be similarly prohibited or restricted and that the quota
preserve the share of the United States market held by the Philip-
pines during a previous representative period. The United States was
willing to demonstrate that it had applied restraints in the categories
in question against all significant suppliers and that the levels allotted
to the Philippines preserved their share of the market. The United
States also contended that article 111(2) (A) was applicable only to
cases where, because of the preferential rate at which Philippine
articles enter the United States, they are the only imports causing or
threatening serious injury in the United States. In such a case, a
discriminatory quota would be proper."
Fortunately for those interested in economic harmony between the
United States and the Philippines, if unfortunately for the interna-
tional lawyer, this dispute never had to be resolved. After abortive
discussions in Manila in October 1963, the Filipinos came to Wash-
ington early in 1964, and at that time a cotton-textile agreement was
successfully negotiated.52 That agreement specifically "does not prej-
udice any interpretation by either government of the [Laurel-Langley]
Agreement.""3
creased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury
to domestic producers of like or directly competitive articles.... [1955] U.S.T.
2981, T.I.A.S. No. 3348.
OExcept as otherwise provided in Article H or in Paragraph 2 of this Article,
neither country shall impose restrictions or prohibitions on the importation of any
article of the other country ... unless the importation of the like article of... all
third countries is similarly prohibited. If either country, imposes quantitative re-
strictions on the importation ... of any article in which the other country has an
important interest and if it makes allotments to any third country, it shall afford
such other country a share proportionate to the amount of the article, by quantity
or value, supplied by... it during a previous representative period, due considera-
tion being given to any special factors affecting the trade in such article. Article
III(1). [1955] 6 U.S.T. 2981, T.I.A.S. No. 3348.51 This distinction was made in the House Ways and Means Committee Report on
the Philippine Trade Agreement Revision Act of 1955. H. R. Rep. No. 934, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1955).
52 [1964] 15 U.S.T. 89, T.I-.AS. No. 5519.
53 [1964] 15 U.S.T. 89, T.I.A.S. No. 5513.
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In addition to trade problems, the last ten years have seen a
reorientation in the Philippine outlook toward the United States and
the rest of the world. Filipinos have witnessed the emergence of many
other newly independent nations. Whether these new nations lean
to the right, to the left, or remain "non-aligned," they pursue policies
which in many cases for the first time are their own. They rejoice
in their independence and look toward increased cooperation with
other new nations to assure themselves a meaningful role in today's
fluid world.
The Philippines are no exception. A new generation of Filipinos
is coming to the forefront, Filipinos who were not raised in the pre-
war period of American tutelage and who do not have the vested
interests in ties with the United States their fathers had. They may
even resent to some degree the legacy of Philippine dependence on
the United States left to them by their ancestors. They believe that,
while allied with the United States in pursuing a foreign and domestic
policy opposed to Communist aggression, the Philippines can exert a
large degree of independent influence in Southeast Asia. If Philippine
efforts are to be successful, Filipinos must, they believe, turn from the
economic reliance placed upon the United States in the past. They
must continue and increase their economic relations with their sister
countries in Southeast Asia.
RETAIL TRADE NATIONALIZATION LAW
At the very time that revision of the 1946 Trade Agreement was
under consideration, the Philippines enacted into law an Act to
Regulate the Retail Business.5" Section 1 of the act, which has become
known as the Retail Trade Nationalization Law, provides in part:
No person who is not a citizen of the Philippines, and no association,
partnership, or corporation the capital of which is not wholly owned
by citizens of the Philippines, shall engage directly or indirectly in the
retail business: Provided, that a person who is not a citizen of the Philip-
pines, or an association, partnership, or corporation not wholly owned
by citizens of the Philippines, which is actually engaged in the said
business on May fifteen, nineteen hundred and fifty four, shall be entitled
to continue to engage therein, unless its license is forfeited in accordance
herewith, until his death or voluntary retirement from said business, in
the case of a natural person, and for a period of ten years from the date
of the approval of this Act or until the expiration of the term of the asso-
ciation or partnership or of the corporate existence of the corporation,
-' R.A. No. 1180 (1954), PHn.. ANN. LAWS tit. 18, §§ 44-49 (1956).
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whichever event comes first, in the case of juridical persons. Failure to
renew a license to engage in retail business shall be considered voluntary
retirement.
Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way impair or abridge
whatever rights may be granted to citizens and juridical entities of the
United States of America under the Executive Agreement signed on
July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty six between that country and
the Republic of the Philippines.
No license shall be issued to any person who is not a citizen of the
Philippines and to any association, partnership or corporation not wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines, actually engaged in the retail busi-
ness, to establish or open additional stores or branches for retail busi-
ness.5"
Section 2 of the act places a registration requirement on all persons
not citizens of the Philippines and corporations not wholly owned by
Philippine citizens who are engaged in the retail business. Violators
are subject to criminal penalties.
While the retail trade bill was being considered in the Philippine
House of Representatives, the United States Embassy at Manila, upon
instructions from the Department of State, delivered to the Philippine
Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs a note expressing concern over the
proposed law. In that note, the Embassy stated, inter alia:
Due to the seriously detrimental effect which legislation of this type
could have on existing and potential future foreign investment in all
fields of economic activity in the Republic of the Philippines, the joint
efforts of your Excellency's Government and my own to accelerate the
economic development of the Republic of the Philippines through foreign
capital investment could be substantially nullified. Such measures as
those embodied in the retail trade bill... could also have a harmful
effect on the climate in which there take place the negotiations, requested
by Your Excellency's Government, for the revision of the Trade Agree-
ment between our two countries. 5
On June 22, 1954, after the law had been enacted, the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs replied to the Embassy's note, stating
that:
In view of the express exemption granted by the Act to citizens of the
United States and United States business enterprises, my Government
G5 R.A. No. 1180, § 1 (1954), Pm. ANN. LAWs tit. 18, § 44 (1956).
GG American Embassy Manila Dispatch No. 1342, to the Dep't of State, June 7, 1954,
File No. 896.055/6-754.
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is unable to perceive how the approval of the Act can have a harmful
effect on the climate in which the negotiations are to take place for the
revision of the Trade Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States.5 7
On July 15, 1954, the American Embassy sent another diplomatic
note to the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs following the
announced decision of the Office of the Treasurer, City of Manila,
that Americans must register under section 2 of the Retail Trade Law.
The note, referring to the Philippine assurance of June 22, 1954,
that American citizens and business enterprises were expressly exempt
from the act, continued:
It has come to the Embassy's attention... that the Office of the Treas-
urer, City of Manila, has ruled that American citizens engaged in retailing
activities should comply with the registration requirements of section 2
of Republic Act No. 1180. In view of the express exemption of American
citizens and firms from the provisions of the Act, it would be appreciated
if your Excellency would have the necessary action taken to correct the
misinterpretation attributed to the Office of the Treasurer in order that
there may be avoided any unnecessary uncertainties in the American
business community.58
In a note dated August 5, 1954, the Philippine Foreign Secretary
replied that the Department of Foreign Affairs had requested the
Philippine Secretary of Finance to enjoin all officers under his depart-
ment charged with enforcement of the retail trade law "to be guided
by the opinion of Secretary of Justice [Tuason] dated July 21, 1954,
to the effect that all American citizens and juridical entities who are
engaged in the retail business are exempt from the provisions of
sections 1 and 2 of the Republic Act No. 1180.""5
The Secretary of Justice's opinion referred to in this note was given
in response to a question from the Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs on the nature and extent of exemptions granted Americans
under the retail trade law. Secretary Tuason concluded that the second
paragraph of section 1 of the retail trade law relating to the rights of
Americans under the 1946 Trade Agreement "was conceived and
adopted with the definite object of excluding American citizens and
57Enclosure No. 1 to American Embassy Manila Despatch No. 1432 to the Dep't
of State, June 25, 1954, File No. 896.005/6-2554.
58 Enclosure No. 1 to American Embassy Manila Despatch No. 52 to the Dep't of
State, July 19, 1954, File No. 896.055/7-1954.
59 Enclosure No. 1 to American Embassy Manila Despatch No. 162 to the Dep't of
State, Aug. 23, 1954, File No. 896.055/8-2354.
[VorL. 40: 447
U.S.-PHILIPPINES' SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
business entities from the operation of the Act regardless of the nature,
extent and force of the rights and obligations provided in the trade
agreement."" The Secretary referred to article X of the 1946 Trade
Agreement giving the President of the United States the right to sus-
pend that agreement if he determined that there was discrimination
against American businesses. He pointed out that the Philippine Con-
gress, in enacting the retail trade law, must have realized that the law,
if applied to American citizens, would have been regarded by the
United States Government as a form of discrimination against them.
The second paragraph of section 1 of the retail trade law was intended,
the Secretary wrote, "to forestall the sure abrogation of the treaty with
the United States if American citizens were barred from the retail
business." Secretary Tuason's opinion concluded with the statement
that "American citizens or juridical entities are exempt from the provi-
sions of sections 1 and 2 of the Republic Act No. 1180 .... "
With these assurances from the Philippine Government and the
Secretary of Justice's opinion, the concern of the United States Govern-
ment and business community over the retail trade law was put to
rest. So reassured was the United States Government that the Ameri-
can Congress was informed, in connection with passage of the Philip-
pine Trade Agreement Revision Act of 1955, that the retail trade law
did not apply to American citizens.6'
Subsequent practice tended to reinforce this view. American citizens
and corporations continued to invest in retail trade activities in the
Philippines. Existing firms expanded their business without any
attempt being made by the Philippine Government to enforce the
licensing provision of section 1 of the retail trade law. Nor were
American firms required to register under section 2 of the law.
-It was not until April 22, 1963, little more than a year before the
ten-year grace period provided by the retail trade law was to expire,
that the situation changed. On that date, Philippine Secretary of
Justice Juan R. Liwag rendered an opinion that in effect reversed
Secretary Tuason's 1954 decision and held that Americans were in
fact fully subject to the provisions of the retail trade law.2
The question put to the Secretary was whether a local subsidiary
of Tidewater Oil Company, an American corporation ninety eight per
60 Ops. SEdC'Y JusTicE 175 (1954).61 Hearings on H.R. 6059, Philippine Trade Agreement Revision Acts, Before the
House Ways and Means Committee, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1955).62 Ops. SEc'Y JusTicE 71 (1963).
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cent owned by American citizens, could engage in retail trade in
the Philippines. Referring to the non-discriminatory provision of
article VII of the Laurel-Langley Agreement, Secretary Liwag rea-
soned that the agreement did not commit the Philippines to place
American citizens or corporations on a better footing than Filipino
citizens or enterprises. He stated that "the commitment not to dis-
criminate carries an obligation to give the other party an equal but
not a better right to conduct business activity in the Philippines."
United States citizens, or enterprises owned or controlled by them,
must be allowed to engage in business activities in the Philippines as
if they were Philippine citizens or enterprises. Since under the retail
trade law, Filipino firms wishing to engage in retail trade must be
wholly owned by Philippine citizens, American firms also must be
wholly owned, i.e., 100 per cent owned by American citizens.
Not surprisingly, this opinion came as a shock to the American busi-
ness community in the Philippines. The assurances given by the Philip-
pine Government in 1954 that Americans were exempt from the law,
and the practice over the years since 1954 confirming that view, sud-
denly seemed to have been cast aside. It would have been virtually
impossible for large American corporations whose shares were traded
on public stock exchanges to prove 100 per cent American ownership.
In addition, the Philippine Anti-Dummy Law6" prevented reorganiza-
tions of the companies in a way that would satisfy the "wholly owned"
requirement.
Moreover, the concept of "retail trade" had been so broadly inter-
preted in the Philippines that it included bulk sales, sales to manufac-
turers, and other transactions which one would normally consider of a
wholesale character. In this regard, the retail trade law in section 4,
defined retail business as meaning "any act, occupation or calling of
habitually selling direct to the general public merchandise, commodi-
ties or goods for consumption.... ." As interpreted, it is the character
of the purchaser and not the quantity of the commodity that deter-
mines the nature of the transaction.64 "If the buyer is a consumer, the
transaction whether in small or large quantity is at retail."6 In addi-
tion, the Secretary of Justice has interpreted "consumption" as "the
use of economic goods resulting in the diminution or destruction of
63 C.A. No. 108 (1936), PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 18, §§ 38-41 (1957).64 City of Manila v. Manila Blueprinting, 74 Phil. 317 (1943) ; Sy Kiong v. Sar-
miento, 90 Phil. 434 (1951).
65 OpS. SEc'Y JusTICE 160 (1963).
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their utilities." 6 This definition does not distinguish between sales of
goods to those who consume them in direct satisfaction of human wants
and desires, and sales of goods destined for use as components of pro-
duction, as production facilities used to make other goods, or in pro-
viding services.
In light of this situation, the Macapagal administration turned to the
Philippine Congress for clarifying legislation. In 1963, a bill was intro-
duced in the Philippine House of Representatives to redefine "retail
trade" by eliminating sales of goods to be used in the manufacture,
processing or production of other goods or for the provision of serv-
ices." However, this bill was not enacted. In the following regular
session of Congress, the Philippine House passed House Bill No. 4274
which would have amended the retail trade law by limiting its appli-
cability to the sale of consumer goods to the general public and by
permitting up to forty per cent alien ownership in companies engaged
in retail trade. The House, however, shortly thereafter recalled the bill
from the Senate when charges were made that the so-called "Chinese
amendment" (permitting only forty per cent alien ownership) had been
"smuggled" into the House Committee Report and the bill itself after
approval by the House. 8 A series of other bills designed principally to
amend the retail trade law by redefining the term "retail trade" were
introduced in both the regular and special sessions of the Congress, but
all such attempts failed."
For its part, the United States Government has taken a very serious
view of these events in the retail trade area. While not wishing to inter-
fere in the internal question of interpretation of Philippine statutes, the
United States Government felt that the original intent of the retail
trade law had been substantially modified through subsequent inter-
pretations. To interpret "wholly owned" as requiring 100 per cent
ownership of the stock of a parent corporation by Philippine or United
States citizens seems unrealistic in the context of the modern corporate
business world. Most, if not all, of the American subsidiaries engaged
in retail business in the Philippines are "wholly owned," i.e., 100 per
cent owned by an American parent corporation. Even if ownership of
the parent is to be determinative, the alien ownership of the parent
American corporation is in most cases minimal-a de minimis test
could easily be applied.
a6 0ps. SECY JUSTICE 325 (1954).
67 H. Bill 4274 (Phil. 1963).
68 H. Bill 157 (Phil. 1964).
6D See e.g., H. Bill 9446 (Phil. 1964); S. Bill 671 (Phil 1964).
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Quite apart from such considerations, however, the basic fact is that
the Philippine Government had on numerous occasions assured the
United States Government that Americans were exempt from the appli-
cation of the retail trade law. These assurances formed an important
part of the negotiating history of the Laurel-Langley Agreement.
Moreover, they had been relied upon by the American business com-
munity in making large and important investments in the Philippines.
The basic question is whether these commitments made by the Philip-
pine Government will be upheld.
Aside from these questions, the Laurel-Langley Agreement has a
strong bearing on the retail trade issue. Article VII"0 of the agreement
prohibits discrimination against American citizens or business enter-
prises owned or controlled by American citizens with respect to their
engaging in business activities in the Philippines. Due to the new inter-
pretation of the retail trade law, business enterprises owned or con-
trolled by American citizens are being adversely affected. It has been
argued, perhaps most effectively by Secretary of Justice Liwag," that
the retail trade law involves no discrimination in this respect. The
law applies the "wholly owned" requiremnt and the broad definition
of "retail trade" to Philippine and American enterprises alike. Yet,
while Secretary Liwag might argue that Filipinos and Americans were
being afforded "equal" treatment, the fact is that American firms,
which are broadly based and publicly owned, are faced with forced
shutdowns, while the law is having little or no practical impact on
Philippine firms which are mostly family owned or closely held. In
practice, therefore, the law under Secretary Liwag's interpretation
would result in discrimination.
It should be pointed out, in passing, that the obligations placed upon
the Philippines in article VII of the Laurel-Langley Agreement are not
unique or peculiarly burdensome to the Philippines. Nor should this
article be viewed as an infringement on Philippines sovereignty and
nationalism. The principle of non-discrimination or "national" treat-
ment for existing business enterprises is a general rule throughout the
free world regardless of treaties; discrimination is the exception. In
fact, non-discriminatory treatment is formally assured to United States
nationals on a reciprocal basis in all friendship, commerce and naviga-
tion treaties between the United States and other friendly countries,
7o See text accompanying note 42 supra.
71 See note 61 supra.
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including a number of less developed countries."' This principle of
national treatment, which is incorporated in so many friendship, com-
merce, and navigation treaties, could not recommend itself to govern-
ments unless they believed it operated to their mutual advantage. The
obvious rationale for the principle is the creation of a favorable climate
for private investment which is so important to the attainment of eco-
nomic development goals.
Perhaps even more serious than the question of discrimination is the
inevitably adverse effect Philippine action of this nature could have on
the whole range of future United States-Philippine economic relations.
Attainment of Philippine economic goals will require large amounts of
foreign, private investment. The climate for such investment will be
clouded if significant harm is done to existing investment.
With these various considerations in mind, President Johnson, on
June 10, 1964, expressed to President Macapagal the concern of the
United States over the retail trade law problem. The full text of his
letter follows:
Dear Mr. President:
I am concerned that a serious problem in the relations between our two
countries may be developing in connection with the Philippine Retail
Trade Nationalization Law.
Under this Law, as recently interpreted, it appears that, after June 19,
1964, a number of important American concerns may be prohibited from
engaging in normal distribution activities because they cannot prove that
they are one hundred percent owned by United States citizens.
I understand that this Act has been construed to apply not only to sales
to consumers for individual consumption, but also to sales of equipment
to manufacturers, bulk sales, and other wholesale-type transactions.
As you know, the United States and the Philippines have been parties
to a trade agreement, the Laurel-Langley Agreement, which, for a num-
72 Since World War II the U.S. has negotiated the following treaties (relevant ar-
ticles noted): Belgium [1963] art. 6, T.IA.S. No. 5432; Republic of China [1948] art.
4, 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871 (art. 4 accords most-favored-nation rights); Den-
mark [1961] art. VIII, 12 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797; Ethiopia [1953] art. VIII,
4 U.S.T. 2134, T.I.A.S. No. 2864; France (Treaty of Establishment) [1960] art. V, 11
U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625; Germany [1956] art. VII, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No.
3593; Greece [1954] art. VIII, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057; Iran [1957] art. V,
8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Ireland [1950] art. VI, 1 U.S.T. 785, T.IA.S. No.
2155; Israel [1954] art VII, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948; Italy [1949] art. III, 63
Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965; and [1961] art. I, 12 U.S.T. 131, T.I.A.S. No. 4685;
Japan [1953] art. VII, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863; Korea [1957] art. VII, 8
U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947; Luxembourg [1963] art. VI, 14 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S.
No. 5306; Muscat [1960] art. V, 11 U.S.T. 1835, T.I.A.S. No. 4530; Netherlands[1957] art. VII, 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942; Nicaragua [1958] art. VII, 9 U.S.T.
449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024; Pakistan [1961] art. VII, 12 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No. 4685;
Viet-Nam [1961] art. V, 12 U.S.T. 1703, T.I.A.S. No. 4890.
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her of years, has been the foundation for a mutually beneficial business
and trading partnership. American business in the Philippines has con-
tributed substantially under the Laurel-Langley Agreement to the eco-
nomic progress and welfare of the Philippines. It has established a solid
record of adherence to Philippine law and it is now quite apprehensive
regarding the effect of this particular statute as it has been recently
interpreted.
On the basis of the Laurel-Langley Agreement, and assurances from
your Government dating back to 1954, it has been our understanding that
American enterprises in the Philippines were exempt from the require-
ments of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law. In view of the Trade
Agreement and because we were assured that American firms were pro-
tected under that Agreement, these firms went ahead and expanded their
activities, including extensive distribution facilities.
Recently, however, the Philippine Secretary of Justice ruled that the
United States' firms were subject to the Retail Trade Nationalization
Law, and under this new interpretation sanctions might be brought
against them which would disrupt their operations and cause large layoffs
of Filipino employees.
We had hoped that through appropriate legislative action by the Phil-
ippine Congress this situation would have been rectified. However, the
Congress has adjourned without passage of clarifying legislation. I un-
derstand that you have called a special session of Congress for action on
a number of important problems, and I very much hope you will be able
to include appropriate amendment of the Retail Trade Nationalization
Law among them.
I believe that successful resolution of this issue is in the best interests
of both our countries. On the other hand, a failure to resolve it satisfac-
torily could do great harm to established and potential investment in the
Philippines. If there are any thoughts on this matter you believe we
should consider, I would be most receptive to them.
With warmest personal good wishes,
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
Despite the introduction of clarifying legislation by President Maca-
pagal, the June 19, 1964, deadline for implementation of the retail
trade law approached with no affirmative action taken by the Philip-
pine Government on this matter. Thereupon, the principal American
companies affected filed suits in the Philippine courts seeking prelimi-
nary injunctions enjoining the Secretary of Commerce and Industry
from enforcing the retail trade law. They also sought declaratory
judgments (1) that petitioners were not engaged in the "retail trade,"
or (2) that if engaged in the retail business, petitioners were exempt
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from the provisions of the retail trade law." In these suits, the com-
panies relied principally on the language of the second paragraph of
section 1 of the retail trade law, the 1954 opinion of Secretary of
Justice Tuason, the 1954 diplomatic exchanges between the Philippine
and American Governments and exchanges between the Philippine and
American Governments and subsequent reliance thereon by American
firms. Article VII of the Laurel-Langley Agreement was also stressed.
The Philippine Solicitor General's replies to all the petitions of the
American companies have been substantially uniform.7 He has argued
principally (1) that the courts have no jurisdiction over the petitions
because the question raised is essentially political-to be resolved by
the executive branch of the Philippine Government through diplomatic
exchanges," and (2) that if the courts do assume jurisdiction, they
should give judicial sanction to Secretary of Justice Tuason's opinion
of July 21, 1954. In this connection, the Solicitor General referred to
the assurances given the United States by the Philippine Government in
1954 and stated:
This commitment of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
to the Government of the United States of America provided the back-
ground and served as the basis of Article VII of the Laurel-Langley
Agreement enacted as Republic Act No. 1355 on June 18, 1955 .... 77
The Solicitor General also quoted the text of a note from the United
States Embassy at Manila to the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs
dated September 4, 1964, as follows:
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments
to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines
and has the honor to refer to the Retail Trade Nationalization Law of the
Philippines.
A number of American companies doing business in the Philippines are
currently seeking declaratory judgments in the Philippines courts that
they are exempt from certain provisions of the Retail Nationalization
Law. The Government of the Philippines is aware of the position of the
United States Government that American companies are exempt from
73 See, e.g., Caltex v. Reyes, Civ. Case No. 57406, Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XVI, (1964). Twenty-three similar suits were filed in the Philippine courts.
74 See, e.g., reply filed July 24, 1964, in Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. v. Reyes, Civ.
Case No. 57412, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII (1964).
75 O December 1, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila rule in the case of
Burroughs, Ltd. v. Reyes, that the court had jurisdiction. Civ. Case No. 57420, Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII (1964).76See text accompanying note 59 supra.
77Memorandum for Respondent filed Sept. 9, 1964, in Burroughs, Ltd. v. Reyes,
Civ. Case No. 57420, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII (1964), p. 8.
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these provisions of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law by virtue of the
Laurel-Langley Agreement and formal assurances given to the United
States by the Government of the Philippines.
If the Philippine courts assume jurisdiction in those cases, the United
States Government hopes that they will be guided by the answer filed by
the Solicitor General of the Philippines and will accept the opinion of
Secretary of Justice Tuason of July 21, 1954 that American citizens and
juridical entities are exempt from the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of
the law. Such a course of action could provide a successful solution to
this problem.
At the same time the United States Government maintains that this is
a matter, as was pointed out by the Solicitor General, entailing interna-
tional commitments and assurances of the Philippine Government on
which both the United States Government and American citizens and
companies have relied for the past ten years. The Government of the
United States continues, therefore, to be deeply concerned in ensuring
that these commitments and assurances are fulfilled.
The Embassy takes this opportunity to renew to the Department of
Foreign Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.7 8
In October 1964, while these cases were still pending in the Philip-
pine courts, President Macapagal paid a state visit to the United
States, and the subject of the retail trade law was discussed with
President Johnson. The joint communique issued at the conclusion of
their talks in Washington contained the following paragraph:
The two Presidents noted the major contribution made by foreign pri-
vate investment to the development and continued strength of their coun-
tries. President Johnson pointed out in this regard that United States
economic relations with the Philippines would be seriously impaired if an
enforcement of the Philippine Retail Trade Nationalization Law were to
prejudice the position of long-established American firms. He observed
that the Government of the Philippines had committed itself that the
United States firms would not be affected by the Retail Trade Nationali-
zation Law. He expressed confidence that the Government of the Philip-
pines would uphold its long-standing commitments contained, inter alia,
in a note of the Department of Foreign Affairs of August 4, 1954.79
Undoubtedly, continuing efforts will be made in the courts, through
diplomatic channels, and in the Philippine legislature to resolve the
problem created for American investment by the retail trade law.
The problem cannot be viewed solely or even principally within the
confines of the retail business framework. Its implications for the
78 Id. at 13a.
7 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 632, 633 (1964).
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future of foreign investment in the Philippines, and consequently for
the continued development and strength of the Philippine economy,
are apparent. Successful resolution of the problem is in the interests of
both the Philippines and the United States.
PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES
The Philippines Need for Foreign Investment. It has become axio-
matic that developing countries cannot successfully achieve satisfactory
economic progress without the influx of substantial foreign private in-
vestment. The United States Agency for International Development
has been aware of the implications of this proposition for some time
and has directed much of its efforts to promoting foreign private
investment in less developed countries.
The Government of the Philippines has recognized the necessity of
attracting private capital. In the Five-Year Socio-Economic Program
for the Philippines, private foreign capital inflows averaging $109
million a year are contemplated." Philippine leaders have repeat-
edly called for new investment to assist in the country's economic
development.
In the past, the Philippines, not surprisingly, received special atten-
tion from United States investors. In addition to the special trade rela-
tionship between the United States and the Philippines, there was the
natural attraction of investment toward a stable, friendly democratic
country. In 1950, United States private investment in the Philippines
totalled $149 million; by 1960 this figure had increased to $414
million.8" Today this trend has stopped. By the end of 1963, estimated
United States investment in the Philippines had increased only $1 mil-
lion over the 1960 level.82
This failure of the Philippines to continue to attract outside capital
can be blamed in good part on the uncertainty created by growing eco-
nomic nationalism, as evidenced in the retail trade act controversy.
Investors are not likely to find comfort in the fact that, despite assur-
ances given by the Philippine Government in 1954, American firms are
threatened with the sanctions of the retail trade law under new rulings
by the Philippine Secretary of Justice. Moreover, other measures have
8 0 MAAGAL, FIVE-YEAR rNTEGRATED SoaCo-EcoNolIC PROGRAM FOR THE PH LIP-
PINES Annex A, at 84 (1962).
sl Survey of Current Business, Office of Business Economics, U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce, Aug. 1963, p. 18 and Aug. 1964, p. 10.82Ibid.
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been proposed which could mean that even the satisfactory settlement
of the retail trade issue would not change the attitude of foreign in-
vestors.
For example, as the Philippine presidential election of 1965 ap-
proaches, there has been increasing pressure in the Islands for imme-
diate elimination of the so-called "parity" provisions embodied in
article VI of the Laurel-Langley Agreement. That article permits
United States citizens to enjoy the same rights of exploitation and
utilization of publicly-owned agricultural and mineral lands as are
enjoyed by Filipinos.8"
Taken as purely economic matter, the rights of parity accorded by
the Philippines to American investors can be considered a useful if not
necessary means of securing full development of Philippine natural re-
sources. It should be recognized that developing countries are often
torn between the need to have foreign investment in the natural re-
source sector and the feeling that such resources are a "national asset"
which should only benefit native citizens. In the Philippines, the issue
is complicated even further by Filipino resentment caused by having to
amend their constitution to permit parity for Americans.8"
Another issue which could create difficulties for American investors
in the Philippines is the proposal made during the last session of the
Philippine Congress that would accord tax exemptions and deprecia-
83 Article VI(1) provides:
The disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, tim-
ber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces and sources of energy, and other natural resources of
either Party, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be
open to citizens of the other Party and to all forms of business enterprise owned
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of such other Party in the same
manner as to and under the same conditions imposed on citizens or corporations
or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Party granting the right.
6 U.S.T. 2981, T.I.A.S. No. 3348 (1955).
84 On March 8, 1965, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy made
the following statement in Manila in response to a press query on the subject of parity:
As you know, this matter was discussed between President Macapagal and
President Johnson last October, and this was noted in the communique. Since then
there have been continuing consultations and my Government has given the matter
careful consideration. 1974 is a long way off and it may be premature to be talking
about what kind of agreement should replace the Laurel-Langley Agreement. That
agreement is a very special contract between our two sovereign countries, and I
think it has served well both Philippine and United States interests in its first
ten years of operation. During the life of the present agreement, its provisions will
naturally continue to be operative. We believe that both countries will want to
have a framework for continuity of a trade and investment relationship which will
be mutually beneficial when the present agreement ceases.
As far as the parity article is concerned-Article VI of the Agreement-we are
aware of Philippine interest in seeing that this provision expires in 1974, and on
our side I can say that we have no intention of seeking its extension. We assume,
of course, that rights acquired prior to 1974 will be protected in accordance with
the Philippine Constitution.
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tion allowances in specified industries to Filipinos and to corporations
having a minimum Philippine ownership. In addition, benefits of profit
repatriation and guarantees against nationalization would be given to
qualifying corporations.
While such incentives for private investments are not unusual, and
co-ownership or other profit sharing arrangements are frequently found
in concessions granted by less developed countries, the proposed Philip-
pine law would be the first to set aside a broad area of economic activity
in which corporations having a specified local participation would enjoy
such a wide range of benefits. These laws would violate article VII of
the Laurel-Langley Agreement in which both countries agree "not to
discriminate in any manner, in respect to their engaging in business
activities, against the citizens or any form of business enterprise owned
or controlled by citizens of the other.... ,"
Again it would seem that the substantive issues in these controversies
are subservient to the political questions. The Philippines for Filipinos
is perhaps a natural reaction in a country recently independent and now
seeking full economic independence. However, the principles involved
should not be so much questions of sovereignty, but rather of the nor-
mal relations between sovereign governments.
Expiration of the Laurel-Langley Agreement. On July 4, 1974, the
United States-Philippine Trade Agreement will terminate. Already, in-
terested parties in both countries have been discussing the future of
United States-Philippine trade relations. In the Philippines, thinking
on the future of a trade agreement with the United States has taken a
variety of forms. Perhaps the most vocal elements are those on the
extreme ends of the spectrum.
On one side are those groups which think the preference philosophy
of the Laurel-Langley Agreement should be continued and expanded.
They base their approach on the belief that the Philippines cannot con-
tinue its economic development, at least in the foreseeable future, with-
out special access to the United States market. Rather than see the ex-
isting preferences wither away, these groups want prompt negotiations
with the United States aimed at securing at least an extension of the
856 U.S.T. 2981, T.I.A.S. No. 3348 (1955). Article 6(3) of the recently negotiated
double tax convention with the Philippines provides as follows:
A corporation of one of the Contracting States, the capital of which is wholly or
partly owned by one or more citizens or corporations of the other Contracting State,
shall not be subjected in the former Contracting State to more burdensome taxes
than is a corporation of the former Contracting State, the capital of which is
wholly owned by one or more citizens or corporations of that former Contracting
State.
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preference system. The position of this segment of Philippine opinion
on other questions such as parity and non-discrimination against United
States investors seems to vary a good deal, but the more realistic pro-
ponents of continued preferences recognize that they are not likely to
be successful if they advocate cutting off the rights of United States
investors.
At the other extreme are those who seek immediate and total abroga-
tion of the Laurel-Langley Agreement. These groups believe that the
destiny of the Philippines lies in its further development of independ-
ence and in leadership in the Far East. To these groups, the provisions
of the Laurel-Langley Agreement infringe on Philippine sovereignty.
Moreover, they fear competition from large American enterprises en-
joying non-discriminatory treatment under the Laurel-Langley Agree-
ment. They recognize the wrench upon the Philippine economy which
would result from termination of the present preferences in the Laurel-
Langley Agreement, but they are willing to pay this price in order to
force economic independence upon the Islands.
In the United States, those interested in trade relations with the Phil-
ippines take little comfort in either extreme position. On the one hand,
extension of a preference system by the United States would fly in the
face of efforts to eliminate other preferential systems which have grown
up over the years. These examples have now been seized upon by the
less-developed countries as a means for improving their lot. It has been
the conviction in the United States that a program of preferences for
the less-developed countries would not operate to their benefit for sev-
eral reasons, the most important being the belief that generally, existing
duties are not high enough to make preferences meaningful, and that in
those few cases where preferences were effective, the advantages would
not necessarily flow equitably among countries nor to the proper groups
within countries. If the United States were to grant an extension of
preferences to the Philippines, our policy could be seriously under-
mined.
However, no agreement would be acceptable which did not ade-
quately protect the rights of United States investors. Since World War
II, the United States has negotiated almost twenty treaties of friend-
ship, commerce and navigation which provide for national treatment for
Americans engaged in business activities abroad.86 While these agree-
ments permit the treaty partners to reserve some rights of business and
86 See note 72 supra.
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commercial activity for their own citizens, none would permit the
wholesale attack on business activities which are contemplated by the
retail trade law, nor would they permit the kind of discrimination em-
bodied in the tax incentive schemes recently introduced into the Philip-
pine Congress.
To what do these considerations add up? It seems clear that trade
relations between the United States and the Philippines are at a critical
point. The right of Americans to carry on their very extensive business
operations in the Philippines is under attack. The basic trade agree-
ment which guides and shapes these trade relations will expire in a
decade, and there is no consensus in the Philippines even as to whether
a new agreement should take its place. Certainly, there is no consensus
on what a new agreement should contain. United States-Philippine
trade relations seem to be a political hot potato being mashed as it is
tossed from party to party.
Unless this atmosphere is cleared, United States investment in the
Philippines is not going to expand and is likely to contract substan-
tially. The repercussions of this development would be broad and could
set back over-all Philippine economic development many years.
The authors believe this critical juncture can be survived by re-exam-
ining the basis of the "special relationship" the United States and the
Philippines enjoy. In 1946, this special relationship embodied the obli-
gations of a former metropolitan government to its newly independent
territory. Given the catastrophic effects of the war in the Philippines,
this obligation included our best efforts to put the Philippine economy
back on its feet-in effect, a form of economic aid.
In 1965, this picture has changed. What was necessary nineteen
years ago as a transfusion to the Philippine economy has now become
a crutch, resented by many elements in the Islands. This is not to say
that the preference system is no longer beneficial to the Philippines,
but rather that it inhibits Philippines trade elsewhere and limits the
necessity that Philippines industries become more competitive. These
preferences are now being phased out under the Laurel-Langley Agree-
ment. We believe this process should continue.
Another fact of life in 1965 is the rise of Philippine nationalism. In
this context, a "special relationship" which looks to Filipinos more like
"(special privileges" for Americans cannot survive. If we are to con-
tinue our special relationship, it must clearly be a relation between
equals.
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The Laurel-Langley Agreement can be looked upon as the 1946
Trade Agreement with reciprocity grafted on to it. What is needed to
supplant that agreement is the more usual type of friendship and
commerce treaty containing a mutual recognition that "national"
treatment accorded by one country to investors of the other can be
looked upon as international cooperation rather than an infringement
of sovereignty.
We believe the future of United States-Philippine trade relations can
be fully beneficial to both countries only if this metamorphosis of the
"special relationship" takes place. In the United States, it must be
recognized that the Philippines have outgrown a trading relationship
established twenty years ago. On the part of the Philippines, hopes for
economic development and leadership can be realized only if there is
recognition that its changed status brings responsibilities as well as
opportunities. In this spirit, both countries can work together to pre-
serve the "special relationship," not as a way of securing special advan-
tages from one another, but as a means of working together toward
common goals. In this atmosphere, the economic interests of each coun-
try can be furthered without detriment to the other.
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